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Abstract
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the
generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem, we propose a
distributed algorithm based on projected dynamics and non-smooth tracking dynamics, even for the case when the interaction
topology of the multi-agent network is time-varying. Moreover, we prove the convergence of the non-smooth algorithm for the
distributed game by taking advantage of its special structure and also combining the techniques of the variational inequality
and Lyapunov function.
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1 Introduction
The seek of generalized Nash equilibrium for non-
cooperative games with coupled constraints has been
widely investigated due to various applications in nat-
ural/social science and engineering (such as telecom-
munication power allocation and cloud computation
(Pang, Scutari, Facchinei & Wang 2008, Ardagna, Pan-
icucci & Passacantando 2013)). Significant theoretic
and algorithmic achievement has been done, referring
to (Pavel 2007, Altman & Solan 2009, Arslan, Demirkol
& Yueksel 2015) and (Facchinei & Kanzow 2010).
Distributed equilibrium seeking algorithms guide a
group of players or agents to cooperatively achieve
the Nash equilibrium (NE), based on players’ local
information and information exchange between their
neighbors in a network. The NE seeking may be viewed
as an extension of distributed optimization problems,
which have been widely studied recently (see (Nedic´ &
Ozdaglar 2009, Shi, Johansson & Hong 2013, Kia, Corte´s
& Mart´ınez 2015)), and on the other hand, distributed
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optimization problems can be handled with a game-
theoretic approach (Li & Marden 2013). In fact, in the
study of complicated behaviors of strategic-interacted
players in large-scale networks, it is quite natural to
investigate game theory in a distributed way. For exam-
ple, distributed convergence to NE of zero-sum games
over two subnetworks was obtained in (Lou, Hong, Xie,
Shi & Johansson 2016). Moreover, a distributed ficti-
tious play algorithm was proposed in (Swenson, Kar &
Xavier 2015), while a gossip-based approach was em-
ployed for seeking an NE of noncooperative games in
(Salehisadaghiani & Pavel 2016).
Aggregative games have become an important type of
games since the well-known Cournot model was pro-
posed, and have recently been studied in the literature,
referring to (Jensen 2010, Cornes & Hartley 2012), for
its broad application in public environmental mod-
els (Cornes 2016), congestion control of communi-
cation networks (Barrera & Garcia 2015), and de-
mand response management of power systems (Ye &
Hu 2017). Usually, linear aggregation functions and
quadratic cost functions in such games were consid-
ered, for example, in (Parise, Gentile, Grammatico &
Lygeros 2015, Paccagnan, Gentile, Parise, Kamgarpour
& Lygeros 2016, Ye & Hu 2017). Also, a recent result
was given for distributed discrete-time algorithms to
seek the NE of an aggregative game with time-varying
topologies in (Koshal, Nedic´ & Shanbhag 2016).
Preprint submitted to Automatica 24 February 2017
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
02
25
3v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
3 F
eb
 20
17
The objective of this paper is to develop a novel dis-
tributed continuous-time algorithm for nonlinear ag-
gregative games with linear coupled constraints and
time-varying topologies. In recent years, continuous-
time algorithms for distributed optimization be-
come more and more popular (Shi et al. 2013, Kia
et al. 2015, Yi, Hong & Liu 2016), partially because they
may be easily implemented in continuous-time or hybrid
physical systems. However, ideas and approaches for
continuous-time design may not be the same as those for
the discrete-time one. Thanks to various well-developed
continuous-time methods, distributed continuous-time
algorithms or protocols keep being constructed, but the
(convergence) conditions may be different from those in
discrete-time cases.
In our problem setup, every player tries to optimize its
local cost function by updating its local decision vari-
able. The cost function depends on not only the local
variable but also a nonlinear aggregation. Moreover, fea-
sible decision variables of players are coupled by linear
constraints. Existing distributed algorithms for aggrega-
tive games (Koshal et al. 2016, Ye & Hu 2017) cannot
solve our problems since they did not consider coupled
constraints. The contribution of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
• The aggregative game model in this paper general-
izes the previous ones in (Paccagnan et al. 2016, Ye
& Hu 2017) by allowing nonlinear aggregation term
and non-quadratic cost functions, and also those
in (Koshal et al. 2016) by considering coupled con-
straints. In addition, the considered game can be
non-potential.
• Inspired from distributed average tracking dynamics
and projected primal-dual dynamics, we take advan-
tage of continuous-time techniques to solve the dis-
tributed problem. With the new idea, our algorithm
is described as a non-smooth multi-agent system with
two interconnected dynamics: a projected gradient
one for the equilibrium seeking, and a consensus one
for the synchronization of the aggregation and the
dual variables. In addition, our algorithm need not
solve the best response subproblems, different from
those in (Parise et al. 2015), and can keep private some
information about the cost functions, local decisions,
and constraint coefficients.
• We provide a method to prove the correctness and con-
vergence of the continuous-time algorithm by combin-
ing the techniques from variational inequality theory
and Lyapunov stability theory.
Notations: Denote Rn as the n-dimensional real vec-
tor space; denote 1n = (1, ..., 1)
T ∈ Rn, and 0n =
(0, ..., 0)T ∈ Rn. Denote col(x1, ..., xn) = (xT1 , ..., xTn )T
as the column vector stacked with column vectors
x1, ..., xn, ‖ · ‖ as the Euclidean norm, and In ∈ Rn×n as
the identity matrix. Denote ∇f as the gradient vector
of a function f and JF as the Jacobian matrix of a map
F . Let C1 ± C2 = {z1 ± z2 | z1 ∈ C1, z2 ∈ C2} be the
Minkowski sum/minus of sets C1 and C2, and rint(C)
be the relative interior of a convex set C (Rockafellar &
Wets 1998, page 25 and page 64).
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give some preliminary knowledge
related to convex analysis, variational inequality, and
graph theory.
A set C ⊆ Rn is convex if λz1 + (1 − λ)z2 ∈ C for any
z1, z2 ∈ C and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. For a closed convex set C, the
projection map PC : Rn → C is defined as
PC(x) , argminy∈C ‖x− y‖.
The following two basic properties hold:
(x− PC(x))T (PC(x)− y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (1)
‖PC(x)− PC(y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖, ∀x, y ∈ Rn. (2)
For x ∈ C, the tangent cone to C at x is
TC(x) , { lim
k→∞
xk − x
tk
|xk ∈ C, tk > 0,
and xk → x, tk → 0}.
and the normal cone to C at x is
NC(x) , {v ∈ Rn | vT (y − x) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ C}.
Lemma 1 (Rockafellar & Wets 1998, Theorem 6.42)
Let C1 and C2 be two closed convex subsets of Rn. If
0 ∈ rint(C1 − C2), then
TC1∩C2(x) = TC1(x) ∩ TC2(x), ∀x ∈ C1 ∩ C2.
A function f : Rn → R is convex if f(λz1 + (1−λ)z2) ≤
λf(z1) + (1− λ)f(z2) for any z1, z2 ∈ C and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
A map F : Rn → Rn is said to be monotone (strictly
monotone) on a set Ω if (x−y)T (F (x)−F (y)) ≥ 0 (> 0)
for all x, y ∈ Ω and x 6= y. A differentiable map F is
monotone if and only if the Jacobian matrix JF (x) (not
necessarily symmetric) is positive semidefinite for each
x (Rockafellar & Wets 1998, Theorem 12.3).
Given a subset Ω ⊆ Rn and a map F : Ω → Rn, the
variational inequality, denoted by VI(Ω, F ), is to find a
vector x ∈ Ω such that
(y − x)TF (x) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Ω,
and the set of solutions to this problem is denoted by
SOL(Ω, F ) (Facchinei & Pang 2003). When Ω is closed
and convex, the solution of VI(Ω, F ) can be equivalently
reformulated via projection as follows:
x ∈ SOL(Ω, F )⇔ x = PΩ(x− F (x)). (3)
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Lemma 2 (Facchinei & Pang 2003, Corollary 2.2.5, and
Theorem 2.2.3) Consider VI(Ω, F ), where the set Ω ⊂ Rn
is convex and the map F : Ω → Rn is continuous. The
following two statements hold:
1) if Ω is compact, then SOL(Ω, F ) is nonempty and
compact;
2) if Ω is closed and F (x) is strictly monotone, then
VI(Ω, F ) has at most one solution.
The following lemma about a regularized gap function
is important for our results.
Lemma 3 (Fukushima 1992) Let F : Rn → Rn be a
differentiable map and H(x) = PΩ(x − F (x)). Define
g : Rn → R as
g(x) = (x−H(x))TF (x)− 1
2
‖x−H(x)‖2.
Then g(x) ≥ 0 is differentiable and its gradient is
∇g(x) = F (x) + (JF (x)− In)(x−H(x)).
Furthermore, it is known that the information exchange
among agents can be described by a graph. A graph
with node set V and edge set E is written as G = (V, E)
(Godsil & Royle 2001). If agent i ∈ V can receive infor-
mation from agent j ∈ V, then (j, i) ∈ E and agent j
belongs to agent i’s neighbor set Ni = {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. G
is said to be undirected if (i, j) ∈ E ⇔ (j, i) ∈ E , and
G is said to be connected if any two nodes in V are con-
nected by a path (a sequence of distinct nodes in which
any consecutive pair of nodes share an edge).
3 Problem Formulation
Consider an N -player aggregative game with cou-
pled constraints as follows. For i ∈ V , {1, ..., N},
the ith player aims to minimize its cost function
Ji(xi, x−i) : Ω → R by choosing the local deci-
sion variable xi from a local strategy set Ωi ⊂ Rni ,
where x−i , col(x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xN ), Ω ,
Ω1 × · · · × ΩN ⊂ Rn and n =
∑
i∈V ni. The strategy
profile of this game is x , col(x1, ..., xN ) ∈ Ω. The
aggregation map σ : Rn → Rm, to specify the cost
function as Ji(xi, x−i) = ϑi(xi, σ(x)) with a function
ϑi : Rni+m → R, is defined as
σ(x) , 1
N
N∑
i=1
ϕi(xi), (4)
where ϕi : Rni → Rm is a (nonlinear) map for the local
contribution to the aggregation. In addition, the feasible
strategy set of this game is K = Ω ∩ X , where X is a set
for linear coupled constraints, defined as
X , {x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈V
Aixi =
∑
i∈V
bi}
= {x ∈ Rn |Ax− b = 0l}, (5)
for some Ai ∈ Rl×ni , bi ∈ Rl, A = [A1, ..., AN ], and
b =
∑
i∈V bi.
For such games with coupled constraints, the following
concept of generalized Nash equilibrium is considered.
Definition 1 A strategy profile x∗ is said to be a gener-
alized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the game if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(y, x∗−i), ∀ y : (y, x∗−i) ∈ K, i ∈ V. (6)
Condition (6) means that all players simultaneously take
their own best (feasible) responses at x∗, where no player
can further decrease its cost function by changing its
decision variable unilaterally.
Moreover, a strategy profile is said to be a variational
equilibrium, or variational GNE, if it is a solution of
VI(K, F ), where the map F (x) : Rn → Rn is defined as
F (x) , col{∇x1J1(·, x−1), ...,∇xNJN (·, x−N )}. (7)
The variational GNEs are well-defined due to the follow-
ing result.
Lemma 4 (Facchinei & Kanzow 2010, Theorem 3.9) If
K is convex, every solution of the VI(K, F ) is also a GNE.
The following assumption and theorem are associated
with the game and the variational GNEs.
Assumption 1
• Smoothness: ∀ i ∈ V, the cost function Ji(xi, x−i) is
twice continuously differentiable.
• Monotonicity: F (x) in (7) is strictly monotone.
• Feasibility: Ω is compact and convex.
• Constraint qualification: 0 ∈ rint(Ω−X ).
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, the considered game
admits a unique variational GNE.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, the smoothness and fea-
sibility in Assumption 1 guarantee the existence of a
variational GNE, and the monotonicity in Assumption
1 guarantees the uniqueness. 
The constraint qualification in Assumption 1 is quite
mild and can be easily verified. In fact, it suffices to check
whether the set K has nonempty relative interior, i.e.,
rint(K) 6= ∅, because in this case,
0 ∈ rint(K −K) ⊆ rint(Ω−X ).
In the distributed design for our aggregative game, the
communication topology for each player to exchange in-
formation is assumed as follows.
3
Assumption 2 The (time-varying) graph G(t) is undi-
rected and connected.
Then we formulate our problem.
Problem 1: Design a distributed algorithm to seek the
variational GNE for the considered aggregative game
with coupled constraints.
Here are some remarks about our formulation.
• Our formulation is quite similar to that in (Koshal
et al. 2016), but we further consider linear coupled
constraints and study its distributed continuous-time
GNE seeking algorithm.
• Players may not measure the values of the aggregation
directly, in contrast to (Parise et al. 2015).
• Our aggregation function can be nonlinear and the
cost functions can be non-quadratic, which are differ-
ent from (Paccagnan et al. 2016) and (Ye & Hu 2017).
In addition, JF (x) can be asymmetric 1 , which was
also discussed in (Paccagnan et al. 2016).
4 Main Results
In this section, we first propose our distributed algorithm
and then analyze its correctness and convergence.
4.1 Distributed Algorithm
Let α, β, γ > 0 be some constants satisfying α > (N −
1)f¯1 and β > γ(N − 1)f¯2, where
f¯1 = sup
i∈V
(
sup
xi∈Ωi
‖∇ϕi(xi)‖ sup
y,z∈Ω
‖y − z‖), (8)
f¯2 = sup
i∈V
(
sup
xi∈Ωi
‖Aixi − bi‖
)
. (9)
For i ∈ V, define the map Gi(·) : Rni+m → Rni as
Gi(xi, yi) , ∇xiJi(·, x−i)|σ(x)=yi (10)
= (∇xiϑi(·, σ) +
1
N
∇σϑi(xi, ·)T∇ϕi)|σ=yi .
Then the distributed continuous-time algorithm to solve
Problem 1 is designed as follows:
x˙i = PΩi(xi −Gi(xi, ηi)−
γ
N
ATi λi)− xi
λ˙i = β
∑
j∈Ni
sgn(λj − λi) + γ(Aixi − bi)
ζ˙i = α
∑
j∈Ni
sgn(ηj − ηi)
ηi = ζi + ϕi(xi)
(11)
1 A game is a potential game if there is a function P (x)
such that ∇P (x) = F (x) (Ye & Hu 2017). This equation
holds if and only if the Jacobian matrix JF (x) is symmetric
(Facchinei & Pang 2003, Theorem 1.3.1).
where sgn(·) is the sign function, λi(t) ∈ Rl, ζi(t) ∈ Rm.
The initial conditions of algorithm (11) are provided as
follows:
xi(0) ∈ Ωi, λi(0) = Aixi(0)− bi, ζi(0) = 0m. (12)
To set the parameters α, β, γ in algorithm (11) needs the
values of f¯1, f¯2 in (8) and (9), which involves additional
distributed calculation as follows: take variables zi with
zi(0) = wi for i ∈ V, and update them by zi(k + 1) =
sup{zi(k), zj(k), j ∈ Ni}; in this way, one can obtain
sup{wi, i ∈ V} within N − 1 steps.
Remark 1 The design idea for this continuous-time
algorithm (11) is totally different from that given in
(Koshal et al. 2016) for discrete-time algorithms. Note
that ηi in our algorithm is to estimate the value of ag-
gregation σ(x), while λi is to estimate a dual variable
associated with the coupled constraints. Moreover, our
algorithm is fully distributed and also preserves some
privacy because the information, such as the local cost
functions, decision variables, and coefficients of the
coupled constraints, need not be shared.
The solution of (11) (with a discontinuous righthand
side) can be well defined in the Filippov sense, which is
unique and absolutely continuous. For convenience, we
will not mention “in the Filippov sense” in the sequel
when there is no confusion.
4.2 Convergence Analysis
Here we give some correctness and convergence analysis
for our proposed algorithm.
First of all, we get the following result by extending
(Chen, Cao & Ren 2012, Theorem 3).
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 2, if
α > (N − 1)f¯ , f¯ ≥ sup
t∈[0,∞)
‖r˙i(t)‖,∀ i ∈ V
then the following system µ˙i(t) = α
∑
j∈Ni(t)
sgn[νj(t)− νi(t)]
νi(t) = µi(t) + ri(t), µi(0) = 0
(13)
can make limt→+∞ νi(t) − 1N
∑N
k=1 rk(t) = 0 for any
i ∈ V with an exponential convergence rate.
Proof. Since G(t) is connected and µi(t) is absolutely
continuous,
∑N
i=1 µ˙i(t) = 0 for almost all t ≥ 0, which
implies
∑N
i=1 µi(t) =
∑N
i=1 µi(0) = 0. Therefore,∑N
i=1 νi(t) =
∑N
i=1 ri(t). Moreover, it is not hard to
obtain
• ∑Ni=1 νi∑j∈Ni sgn(νj − νi) = 12 ∑(i,j)∈E(t) |νi − νj |;
• for any 1 ≤ k, l ≤ N , |µk−µl| ≤ 12
∑
(i,j)∈E(t) |νi−νj |;
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• ∑Ni=1 |νi − 1N 1T ν| ≤ 1N ∑Ni=1∑Nj=1,j 6=i |νi − νj | ≤
N−1
2
∑
(i,j)∈E(t) |νi − νj |.
Define (t) , maxi,j∈V |νi(t)− νj(t)| and
V (t) , 1
2
‖ν(t)− 1
N
11T ν(t)‖2.
Clearly, (t) ≤ 12
∑
(i,j)∈E(t) |νi(t) − νj(t)| and V (t) =
1
2
∑N
i=1 |νi(t)− 1N
∑N
k=1 rk(t)|2 ≥ 0. Since V (t) is abso-
lutely continuous, we have that, for almost all t > 0,
V˙ (t) ≤ −α− (N − 1)f¯
2
∑
(i,j)∈E(t)
|νi(t)− νj(t)|
≤ −(α− (N − 1)f¯)(t) ≤ 0.
Because (t) ≥ 0 is absolutely continuous and (α− (N −
1)f¯)
∫ +∞
0
(t) ≤ V (0) < +∞, (t) → 0 as t → +∞.
Then V (t) ≤ (t) and V˙ (t) ≤ −(α − (N − 1)f¯)V (t) for
almost all t ∈ [t˜,+∞) with a sufficient large t˜, which
implies the conclusion. 
Next, we give the following result, whose proof is quite
straightforward by Lemma 5.
Lemma 6 Consider algorithm (11) under Assumption
2. Let σ(x) be in (4) and define
λ¯(t) =
γ
N
(
Ax(0)− b+
∫ t
0
(Ax(τ)− b)dτ
)
. (14)
Then, for any i ∈ V, ‖ηi(t)− σ(x(t))‖ → 0 and ‖λi(t)−
λ¯(t)‖ → 0 exponentially.
Let X∗×Λ∗ be the solution set of the following equation
with respect to (x, λ¯) 0 = PΩ(x− F (x)−
γ
N
AT λ¯)− x
0 =
γ
N
(Ax− b)
, (15)
and let X+×Λ+ be the positive limit set of (x(t), λ¯(t)),
where x(t) is in (11) and λ¯(t) is in (14).
Lemma 7 If limt→+∞ x˙(t) = 0 and limt→+∞ ˙¯λ(t) = 0,
then X+ × Λ+ ⊆ X∗ × Λ∗.
Proof. If X+ × Λ+ 6= ∅, then, for any (x+, λ¯+) ∈ X+ ×
Λ+, there exists {tq}+∞q=1 such that limq→+∞ x(tq) = x+
and limq→+∞ λ¯(tq) = λ¯+. By taking the limit of tq to
(11) and (14), one obtains according to Lemma 6 that
(x+, λ¯+) is a solution of equation (15). Thus, the con-
clusion follows. 
The next result reveals another property of X∗ × Λ∗,
related to the variational GNE.
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1, x∗ is the variational
GNE if and only if there exists some λ¯∗ ∈ Rl such that
(x∗, λ¯∗) ∈ X∗ × Λ∗.
Proof. Sufficiency. Suppose (x∗, λ¯∗) ∈ X∗ ×Λ∗. Then it
follows from the definition of projection operator that
x∗ ∈ Ω. Moreover, x∗ ∈ X since Ax∗ − b = 0. By (3),
x∗ ∈ SOL(Ω, F (x) + γNAT λ¯∗), i.e.,
(x− x∗)T (F (x∗) + γ
N
AT λ¯∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Ω. (16)
Because K ⊂ Ω and (x∗)TAT λ¯∗ = bT λ¯∗, we have
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ − γ
N
(x− x∗)TAT λ¯∗
= − γ
N
(λ¯∗)T (Ax− b) = 0, ∀x ∈ K.
Thus, {x∗} = SOL(K,F ), i.e., x∗ is the variational
GNE.
Necessity. Suppose that x∗ is the variational GNE. We
claim that there exists some λ¯∗ such that
− F (x∗) ∈ γ
N
AT λ¯∗ +NΩ(x∗). (17)
Otherwise, there is a hyperplane separating the point
−F (x∗) and the set {AT λ¯ | λ¯ ∈ Rl} +NΩ(x∗). Namely,
there is a vector ω ∈ Rn such that
ωTF (x∗) < 0, (18a)
Aω = 0, (18b)
dTω ≤ 0, ∀ d ∈ NΩ(x∗). (18c)
From (18b) and (18c), ω ∈ TΩ(x∗) ∩ TX (x∗). Moreover,
with Assumption 1, ω ∈ TΩ∩X (x∗) = TK(x∗) according
to Lemma 1. Recalling the definition of the tangent cone,
there exist xk ∈ K and tk > 0 such that
xk → x∗, tk → 0, and lim
k→∞
xk − x∗
tk
= ω.
Consequently,
ωTF (x∗) = lim
k→∞
(xk − x∗)TF (x∗)
tk
≥ 0,
which contradicts to (18a). It completes the proof. 
Clearly, X∗ = {x∗} from Theorems 1 and 2, where x∗ is
the unique variational GNE under Assumption 1.
Finally, it is time to give our convergence result.
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, system (11)
is stable and converges to the set X∗ × Λ∗, that is, limt→+∞ ‖λi(t)− λ¯(t)‖ = 0, ∀ i = 1, ..., Nlim
t→+∞ ||(x(t), λ¯(t))− PX∗×Λ∗(x(t), λ¯(t))|| = 0
(19)
with λ¯(t) defined in (14).
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Proof. Since x˙ ∈ TΩ(x), x(t) ∈ Ω for all t ≥ 0. Also, we
have
x˙i(t) = PΩi(xi −Gi(xi, σ(x))−
γ
N
ATi λ¯(t))
− xi(t) + ei(t), (20)
where ‖ei(t)‖ = ‖PΩi(xi − Gi(xi, σ(x)) − γNATi λ¯(t)) −
PΩi(xi−Gi(xi, ηi)− γNATi λi(t))‖ ≤ ‖Gi(xi, σ(x)−Gi(xi,
ηi)‖+‖ γNATi (λ¯(t)−λi(t))‖ ≤ k¯(‖σ(x)−ηi(t)‖+‖λ¯(t)−
λi(t)‖), for some k¯ > 0. Let e(t) = col{e1(t), ..., eN (t)}.
Hence, e(t) vanishes exponentially according to Lemma
6.
Define
θ(t) ,
[
x(t)
λ¯(t)
]
, F̂ (θ) ,
[
F (x) + γNA
T λ¯
− γN (Ax− b)
]
,
Θ , Ω× Rl, Ĥ(θ) , PΘ(θ − F̂ (θ)),
(21)
and let θ∗ ∈ X∗ ×Λ∗. Consider the following Lyapunov
function
V (t) , (θ− Ĥ(θ))T F̂ (θ)− 1
2
‖θ− Ĥ(θ)‖2 + 1
2
‖θ − θ∗‖2 .
(22)
It follows from Lemma 3 that V (t) ≥ 0 and
V˙ (t) = (∇θV )T θ˙(t) = (∇θV )T (Ĥ(θ)− θ) + eˆ(t), (23)
where,
eˆ(t) = [e(t),0l]
T∇θV = e(t)T
[
F (x) +
γ
N
AT λ¯(t)
+ (∇F (x)− In)
(
x− PΩ(x− F (x)− γ
N
AT λ¯(t))
+
γ
N
AT (Ax− b))+ x(t)− x∗].
Since x(t) ∈ Ω is bounded, λ¯(t) in (14) satisfies ‖λ¯(t)‖ ≤
K1 + K2t for t ≥ 0 with some constants K1,K2 > 0.
Also, since e(t) is exponentially convergent, ‖eˆ(t)‖ ≤
(K3 + tK4)e
−K5t for some constants K3,K4,K5 > 0,
which further implies
∫ +∞
0
‖eˆ(t)‖dt < +∞. (24)
On the other hand, after calculations, we have
(∇θV )T (Ĥ(θ)−θ) = −W1(θ)−W2(θ)−W3(θ)−W4(θ),
where
W1(θ) = (θ
∗ − Ĥ(θ))T (F̂ (θ) + Ĥ(θ)− θ), (25a)
W2(θ) = (θ − θ∗)T F̂ (θ∗), (25b)
W3(θ) = (θ − θ∗)T (F̂ (θ)− F̂ (θ∗)), (25c)
W4(θ) = (Ĥ(θ)− θ)TJ F̂ (θ)(Ĥ(θ)− θ). (25d)
It follows from (1) that W1(θ) ≥ 0. Moreover,
W2(θ) ∈ (x− x∗)T (−NΩ(x∗)) ⊆ R+, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. (26)
Furthermore, for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with x 6= x′, we obtain
(θ− θ′)T (F̂ (θ)− F̂ (θ′)) = (x− x′)T (F (x)−F (x′)) > 0,
(27)
since F (x) is strictly monotone. Then W3(θ) ≥ 0. Also,
because J F̂ (θ) is positive semidefinite, W4(θ) ≥ 0.
Therefore,
V˙ (t) ≤ −W3(t) + eˆ(t). (28)
Then it follows from (24) that
0 ≤
∫ +∞
0
W3(t)dt ≤ V (0)− lim sup
t→+∞
V (t)
+
∫ +∞
0
eˆ(t)dt < +∞,
Consequently, W3(t) → 0 as t → +∞, which implies
limt→+∞ x(t) = x∗. Moreover, lim supt→+∞ V (t) <
+∞, which implies that λ¯(t) is bounded. Therefore,
the positive limit set X+ × Λ+ 6= ∅. It follows from
(14) that limt→+∞ ˙¯λ(t) = Ax∗ − b = 0. Furthermore,
x˙(t) is uniformly continuous because the trajectory of
(11) is absolutely continuous and the righthand side of
the differential equation with respect to x(t) in (11)
is uniformly continuous in t. Since x(t) is convergent,
limt→+∞ x˙(t) = 0 by the well-known Barbalat’s lemma.
Thus, (19) holds according to Lemmas 6 and 7. 
Remark 2 Our algorithm can be viewed as a distributed
perturbed projected dynamics with the exponentially van-
ishing perturbation term ei(t) in (20). Although some
projected dynamics without any perturbation was stud-
ied, e.g., in (Yi et al. 2016), the analysis for the perturbed
one is novel.
5 Numerical Examples
Two numerical examples are given in this section.
5.1 Nash-Cournot Game
Consider a Nash-Cournot game played by N competi-
tive firms to produce a kind of commodity. For i ∈ V =
{1, ..., N}, firm i chooses xi ∈ Ωi as the quantity of
the commodity to produce and has the cost function as
ϑi(xi, σ) = (ci−p(σ))xi, where ci is the production price
6
Fig. 1. The trajectories of the strategy profile of Nash–
Cournot game without (the upper one) and with (the lower
one) the linear coupled constraint.
of firm i, and p = d −Nσ(x) is the market price deter-
mined by the aggregation function σ(x) = 1N
∑
j∈V x
2
j .
Our numerical setting is as follows.
(i) N = 20 and V = {1, ..., 20}.
(ii) For each firm i ∈ V, Ωi = [0, 20], ci = 10+20(i−1)
and d = 1200.
(iii) Firms from i = 1 to i = 10 share a scare resource
as
∑10
i=1 xi = 20.
(iv) the communication graph G(t) is time-varying and
randomly generated.
(v) Parameter setting of our algorithm is α = 20, β =
400 and γ = 20.
Figure 1 shows the convergence to the NE (the upper
one) and GNE (the lower one), which illustrates the ef-
fectiveness of our algorithm.
5.2 Demand Response Management
Consider N electricity users with the demand of energy
consumption. For each i ∈ V, xi ∈ [ri, r¯i] is the energy
consumption of the ith user and Ci(xi, σ(x)) is the cost
function in the following form
Ci(xi, σ(x)) = ki(xi − χi)2 + P (σ(x))xi,
where ki is constant and χi is the nominal value of energy
consumption for i = 1, ..., N , with P (σ(x)) = aNσ(x) +
p0 and σ(x) =
1
N
∑
i∈V xi. We adopt the same numerical
setting as given in (Ye & Hu 2017) as follows:
(i) N = 5, ki = 1, a = 0.04, p0 = 5.
(ii) χ1 = 50, [r1, r¯1] = [45, 55]; χ2 = 55, [r2, r¯2] =
[44, 66]; χ3 = 60, [r3, r¯3] = [46, 72]; χ4 =
Fig. 2. The trajectories of the strategy profile of demand
response management game without (the upper one) and
with (the lower one) the linear coupled constraint.
65, [r4, r¯4] = [52, 78]; χ5 = 70, [r5, r¯5] = [56, 84].
The NE of the game has been calculated in (Ye & Hu
2017) as x∗ = [45, 46.4, 51.3, 56.2, 61.1]T . Note that the
total energy consumption at this NE may be too far
from the normal value because
∑5
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑5
i=1 χi−40.
Here, we further impose the following linear constraint∑5
i=1 xi =
∑5
i=1 χi − 25. The communication graph is
randomly generated and the parameters in our algorithm
are given as α = 30, β = 100, and γ = 2. Then the GNE
is obtained as x∗ = [45.2, 50.1, 55, 59.9, 64.8]T . Figure 2
shows the convergence to the NE (the upper one) and
GNE (the lower one), which again illustrates our algo-
rithm.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, aggregative games with linear coupled con-
straints were considered and a distributed continuous-
time projection-based algorithm was proposed for the
GNE seeking. The correctness and convergence of the
proposed non-smooth algorithm were proved by virtue
of variational inequalities and Lyapunov functions, and
moreover, two numerical examples were given for illus-
tration.
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